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At present, NATO is facing a severe crisis and has showed symptoms of disintegration and 
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In fact, NATO has constantly violated its constitutive treaty and many other international 
conventional and customary norms, including ius cogens rules. However, the organization 
has never assumed any negative legal consequences for its internationally unlawful 
behavior. This situation has reduced the legitimacy of the institution and has corroded, from 
the inside and the outside, states’ will to cooperate with the fulfilment of its objectives. Thus, 
NATO could only surmount its current crisis and continue to play a crucial role as a guardian 
of the international peace and security and as a promoter of the rule of law at the global 
level, if it accepts to submit its political and military power to international law.
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Introduction
the post-world war ii international liberal order was born with the promise to 
preserve future generations “from the scourge of war” and to guarantee, beyond all, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. this order was constructed 
on the basis of a complex legal and institutional framework, aimed to foster states’ 
economic, cultural and social development and to promote democracy and the 
rule of law. to that effect were created, in an extremely short period of time, many 
international intergovernmental organizations: the united Nations (u.N.), in 1945, the 
two Bretton woods institutions–the world Bank (wB) and the international Monetary 
Fund (iMF)–in 1947, and the North Atlantic treaty Organization (NAtO) in 1949.
More than 70 years after their creation, these institutions suffer a deep structural 
crisis and are not able to provide efficient responses to the demands of the 
international community, at the beginning of the 21st Century.
NAtO’s crisis is particularly significant in this regard, as it has been frequently 
considered as one of the main institutional foundations of the post-world war ii 
international liberal order.1
NAtO is a military alliance, which establishes a collective defense system 
between the united states (u.s.), Canada and 29 european states, 22 of which 
are members of the european union (eu). From a legal standpoint, NAtO is an 
intergovernmental international organization, created by a constitutive treaty–the 
North Atlantic treaty–and endowed with international legal personality. during the 
first 40 years after its creation, NAtO’s main purpose was to defend the territorial 
integrity and the sovereignty of its european Member states from the influence and 
the military ambitions of the soviet union. After the end of the Cold war, NAtO’s 
military interventions were rather actions taken in the context of internal conflicts 
1  robert kagan, NAtO’s Global Peace is unraveling and we Can’t see it, Brookings, 15 July 2018 (Jul. 2, 
2020), available at https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/15/natos-global-
peace-is-unraveling-and-we-cant-see-it/.
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on the territory of no Member states. NAtO actively took part in the civil war in 
ex-yugoslavia, through operations in Bosnia and herzegovina and kosovo, at the 
end of the 90’s. in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 september 2001, NAtO’s 
members put in practice the organization’s collective defense system to protect 
the security of the u.s. and joined this country in its war in Afghanistan, in 2003. in 
2011, a military coalition, placed under the authority of NAtO, intervened in the civil 
war in Libya and supported the rebel groups against the Government of General 
Muammar Gaddafi. Only 5 years later, in 2016, after the arrival of donald trump to 
the white house, the euro-Atlantic alliance entered in a period of severe crisis and 
showed symptoms of disintegration and polarization of the relations between its 
Member states. At the last head meeting of NAtO’s Council, in december 2019, in 
London, French President, emmanuel Macron, qualified NAtO’s current crisis as 
a “brain death.”2
NAtO’s crisis has been analyzed mainly by specialist in international politics3 
and has received little attention by international law scholars. the North Atlantic 
treaty is one of the briefest treaties in international law’s history and certainly, the 
less studied. Almost all the constitutive treaties of international intergovernmental 
organizations count with an official “commentary,” article by article. this is not the 
case for the North Atlantic treaty. even its travaux préparatoires were kept secret for 
many years and de-classified and published only recently.4 however, the highly 
political nature of NAtO and its constitutive treaty doesn’t place its functions outside 
international law’s scope of study and regulation. Quite on the contrary, NAtO’s 
intervention in international relations strongly relies on a full understanding of the 
international legal norms and principles that rule its behavior.
in this sense, the main objective of this article will be to provide a legal perspective 
on NAtO’s alleged “brain death.” it will argue that the main cause of NAtO’s current 
crisis is the organization’s special status under international law. in fact, NAtO seems 
to be not only a non-legal subject of study, but also an entity placed “beyond” the 
respect for international law. As it will be shown in the first part of the research, 
NAtO has constantly violated its constitutive treaty and many other international 
conventional and customary norms, including ius cogens rules. however, the second 
part of the article will prove that the organization has never assumed any negative 
2  NAtO Alliance experiencing Brain death, says Macron, BBC, 7 November 2019 (Jul. 2, 2020), available 
at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50335257.
3  Magnus Petersson, NATO and the Crisis in the International Order: The Atlantic Alliance and its Enemies 
(London: routledge, 2018); douglas Lute & Nicholas Burns, NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis, report, 
Belfer Center for science and international Affairs, harvard kennedy school (February 2019) (Jul. 2, 
2020), available at https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nato-seventy-alliance-crisis.
4  steven hill, Keynote Presentation, Conference, NAtO@70: the role of international Law in Collective 
security, 27 september 2019 (Jul. 2, 2020), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sr0yi8 
v7NrQ.
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legal consequences for its internationally unlawful behavior. it seems that the rules 
of the post-world war ii international liberal order were designed to afford to this 
institution an almost complete impunity in international and domestic law. this 
impunity has lessened the legitimacy of the organization and has corroded, from the 
inside and the outside, states’ will to cooperate with the fulfilment of its objectives. 
Consequently, from a legal perspective, NAtO could only surmount its current crisis 
and continue to play a crucial role as a guardian of the international peace and 
security and as a promoter of the rule of law at the global level, if it accepts to submit 
its political and military power to international law.
1. The Violations of the North Atlantic Treaty in NATO’s Practice
1.1. The Transgressions of NATO’s Constitutive Treaty’s Preamble
By virtue of the Preamble of the North Atlantic treaty,
the Parties to this treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the united Nations and their desire to live in peace with all 
peoples and all governments.
they are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and 
civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual 
liberty and the rule of law.
the principles of democracy, individual liberty and respect for the rule of law 
are not only the core values of NAtO’s constitutive treaty, but also the axiological 
foundations of the whole international liberal order. this order was built upon the 
historical, political, cultural and even linguistic affinity between countries from 
the so-called “west” (essentially, western europe and the u.s.). the end of world 
war ii and the end of the Cold war sealed the victory of these values over other 
“civilizational” options, such as the envisaged by Nazi Germany, imperialistic Japan 
and authoritarian soviet union, and permitted the consolidation of the euro-Atlantic 
leadership over international community’s destiny.5 At the same time, the North 
Atlantic treaty’s references to “democracy, liberty and the rule of law” reveal the 
central place that the u.s.’ domestic political culture occupied in the vertical and 
hegemonic liberal international order. the u.s.’ privileged position after the end of 
world war ii allowed this country to become the main “architect” of the legal and 
political design of all the international institutions created in this period. the main 
objective of the recourse to these (western and American) institution building values 
was to create a global environment where American hegemony and super-power 
(military, economic and political) could flourish and be maintained. Additionally, 
5  G. John ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order 
(Princeton: Princeton university Press, 2012).
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these values were to serve as a catalyst for the development of strong and stable 
democratic institutions and human rights protection mechanisms in the domestic 
legal systems of the countries from the rest of the world.
North Atlantic treaty’s Preamble’s values and principles are essential for the 
cohesion and the cooperation among NAtO’s Member states, but these values are 
frequently invoked, as well, towards third countries. NAtO’s “legal acquis” includes, 
in the conditions for membership in the organization, a strong commitment to 
democracy and the rule of law.6 these requirements were put in practice in all 
the admission processes, including the last ones, for Croatia and Albania, in 2009, 
and for Macedonia, in 2016.7 Additionally, since 2011, NAtO has created a special 
mission for “rule of law” building during its peacekeeping operations (NATO Rule of 
Law Field Support Mission),8 in order to assist host countries in strengthening their 
democratic institutions and commitment to the rule of law.9
Finally, the rule of law standard is used by NAtO in measuring the degree of 
external threats to the principles and values, endorsed by the North Atlantic treaty’s 
Preamble. in this sense, russia is frequently considered as the euro-Atlantic’s alliance 
biggest challenge and the strongest opponent to its security politics. since its first 
election, in 2000, as President of the russian Federation, vladimir Putin has (re)
instituted a strong authoritarian government. the recovery of russian economy, 
completely devastated in 1990, paved the way toward the centralization of power 
in Putin’s hands. russian foreign policy sought (once again) to expand its influence 
spheres around the world (in eastern europe, Middle east, and Latin America, for 
example) through alliances with other no democratic regimes, like China and iran. 
thus, for NAtO, the weakness of democracy and the rule of law at the domestic level, 
has strengthened russia’s military capacities and traditional hostility towards the 
western (euro-Atlantic) principles and values, as foundation of the global order.10
But the violation of the North Atlantic treaty’s Preamble’s principles and values 
doesn’t come only from states that are not members of NAtO, such as russia. in fact, 
6  By virtue of Article 10 of the North Atlantic treaty,
"the Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other european state in a position to further 
the principles of this treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to 
this treaty …
this duty is detailed in the Alliance’s 1995 study on enlargement, which establishes as conditions for 
admission of new members to NAtO, the existence of democratic political system and a free trade 
domestic market."
7  North Atlantic treaty Organization, NAtO enlargement & Open door, Fact sheet (July 2016) (Jul. 2, 
2020), available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160627_1607-
factsheet-enlargement-eng.pdf.
8  Id.
9  NAtO has put in place this Mission during its operations in Afghanistan, for example.
10  Petersson 2018, at 10.
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one of the main causes of the alliance’s current crisis is their violation by NAtO’s 
members, themselves.
europe represents no more the most “liberal-democratic” island of the world.11 
the financial crisis in 2008 and the current migration crisis have conducted europe 
to one of its worst political crisis after the end of world war ii. Authoritarian and 
populist parties have replaced liberal democracy in many countries of Central 
and eastern europe, such as Poland, hungary, slovakia, the Czech republic, and 
Bulgaria.12 Populist and nationalist parties have also won victories in France, italy, 
and Austria.13 turkey has instituted an authoritarian regime under recep tayyip 
erdoğan’s Presidency and has distanced itself from the respect for democracy and 
the rule of law.14
the no respect for democracy and the rule of law in NAtO’s european Member 
states is aggravated by the situation in the u.s., after the election of donald trump. 
his foreign policy has been the most significant “crusade” an American President has 
ever had against international law and against the (originally American) values and 
principles of democracy and the rule of law. emblematic in this respect have been 
his decisions to leave the u.N. human rights Committee, and its position toward 
the u.s.’ european “closest allies,” seen less as “partners and friends” and more as 
“bad countries”–competitors that have taken “advantages of the u.s.” the list of 
aggressions and humiliations against european countries in trump’s foreign policy 
is large. the elevation of tariffs on european imports and the consequent “trade war” 
against eu countries, the attacks against the “nuclear deal” with iran or the decision 
to recognize Jerusalem as israeli capital, without taking account of the position of 
the u.s.’ european and NAtO allies are just some few examples. As mentioned above, 
NAtO’s core principles and values are the result of a historical affinity and a close 
11 Petersson 2018, at 24.
12  in Poland, the Law and Order Party, in the Government since 2015, has implemented a robust anti-
migration domestic policy and has adopted constitutional reforms that has affected the autonomy of 
the Judicial Branch of the Government and its capacity to control the legality of executive Power’s acts. 
in hungary, viktor Orbán’s party has transformed itself into a populist, nationalist and conservator party. 
in slovakia and the Czech republic the parties in the Government have developed anti-immigrant, pro-
russian and xenophobic tendencies. in Bulgaria, the “Patriotic Front,” in coalition with the Government, 
has kept racist, xenophobic and anti-immigrant discourses, mixed with discrimination policies towards 
the principal ethnical minorities in the country (gypsies and turkish).
13  in France, the Front National party and its leader–Marine Le Pen–have won popularity through a com-
bination of fervent nationalism, opposition to immigration and hostility towards the european union. 
in italy, the populist and eurosceptic party of Five star Movement (Movimento 5 stelle), had an 
unexpected success in the 2013 elections and arrived to the Government after the general elections 
in 2018. in Austria, the populist Freedom Party came to power in coalition with another party, even if 
some of its members have a confirmed neo-Nazi past.
14  turkey has also developed a very close relationship with russia. in 2016, President Putin criticized the 
failed coup d’état in turkey, while President erdoğan blamed the ue and the u.s. for supporting it. in 2018, 
without taking account on NAtO’s warnings, turkey bought russian missiles, and in 2019, it invaded the 
North of syria, in its intent to fight against the kurdish separatist movements. Petersson 2018.
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cooperation relationship between the u.s. and europe. the negative consequences of 
trump’s foreign policy on the euro-Atlantic partnership have an extremely corrosive 
effect on these values. Additionally, trump has attacked not only the european 
allies, but NAtO itself. in many public speeches, the u.s. President has considered 
that “NAtO is as bad as NAFtA,” as it is “too costly for the u.s.”15 in other occasions, 
trump has warned the european countries that if they don’t pay and/or increment 
their financial contributions to NAtO, the u.s. will not support their security defense 
no more.16 in NAtO’s head meeting in Brussels, in 2018, trump attacked Germany 
and denounced its extreme dependence on russian gas, considering that it has 
become Putin’s “captive client.” After this meeting, he threat the european allies that 
if they don’t increment their financial contribution to NAtO, the u.s. would “go alone,” 
making allusion to the possibility for this country to retire from the organization.17 
trump’s competitive and contractualist vision of international organizations, in 
general, and NAtO, in particular, doesn’t seem to consider that North Atlantic treaty’s 
Preamble’s democratic and liberal values are “sacro-saint.”
1.2. The Violations of Articles 1, 2, 7 and 8 of the North Atlantic Treaty
By virtue of Article 1 of the North Atlantic treaty,
the Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the united Nations, to 
settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful 
means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice 
are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the 
united Nations.
this Article is a substantial copy of Article 2(4) of the u.N. Charter18 and should 
be interpreted in conformity with its Article 33.19
the general prohibition to use force in intergovernmental relations, established 




18  According to this provision,
"All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the united Nations."
19  Article 33 states that
"Any dispute that is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security should first 
be addressed through negotiation, mediation or other peaceful means, and states that the Council 
can call on the parties to use such means to settle their dispute."
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considered as an ius cogens rule.20 the u.N. Charter provides two unique exceptions to 
that prohibition- the individual self-defense of Article 5121 and the collective defense 
system, articulated in Chapter vii of the Charter and operated by the u.N. security 
Council.
the “raison d’être” of NAtO and the principal objective of the North Atlantic treaty is to 
establish a regional collective defense system between its Member states, in accordance 
with Article 52 of the u.N. Charter.22 By virtue of Article 5 of the North Atlantic treaty,23 
NAtO’s collective defense system should be consistent with the rules governing the use 
of force (ius ad bellum), as established in the u.N. Charter and in general international 
law. in the same sense, Article 7 of the North Atlantic treaty states:
this treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in 
any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are 
members of the united Nations, or the primary responsibility of the security 
Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.
this is because the u.N. Charter’s obligations enjoy primacy over those contained in 
other treaties, including the North Atlantic treaty.24 Further support for this premise is 
found in the vienna Convention on the Law of treaties (Art. 30), which provides that
when a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered 
as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty 
prevail.
20  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 
Merits, Judgment, i.C.J. reports 1986, p. 14.
21  By virtue of Article 51,
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense 
if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the united Nations, until the security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."
22  According to Article 52 of the u.N. Charter, it is possible, for u.N. Member states, to create regional 
collective defense systems if they are consistent with the use of force governing rules of the Charter.
23  this provision establishes that
"the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in europe or North America shall 
be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack 
occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by 
Article 51 of the Charter of the united Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking 
forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, 
including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. 
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to 
the security Council. such measures shall be terminated when the security Council has taken the 
measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security."
24  Article 103 states that members’ obligations under the u.N. Charter override their obligations under 
any other treaty.
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Consequently, NAtO’s collective defense system can only be activated if one of 
its Member states is a victim of an “armed attack,” according to Article 51 of the u.N. 
Charter. the exercise of the right to self-defense should also obey to the Caroline 
case customary conditions: proportionality, necessity, and immediate character.25 
A contrario, if NAtO decides to use force, when none of its Member states is victim 
of an “armed attack,” or if its response to that armed attack is not immediate, 
proportional and necessary, the organization would be committing a violation of 
the conventional and customary rules governing the use of force, that could amount 
to an act of aggression, prohibited in international law.
the only other option to use armed force legally, by virtue of international law, 
is to do so on behalf of the international community, as a whole, acting on the basis 
of an express authorization of the u.N. security Council.26 thus, a military operation, 
led by NAtO, which is not deployed in response to an armed attack against one of its 
members, can be legal, if the u.N. security Council has authorized NAtO and/or its 
Member states to “use all necessary measures” (argot of the Council to name the use 
of armed force) to put an end to a threat to the international peace and security.
in more than 70 years of history, the collective defense clause of Article 5 of the 
North Atlantic treaty has been invoked as a response to an armed attack against one 
of NAtO’s Member states in only one occasion.27 the other military interventions of 
this organization constituted violations of the North Atlantic treaty, the u.N. Charter 
and general international law.
NAtO’s intervention in kosovo, at the end of the 90’s, violated Article 2(4) of the 
u.N. Charter and Articles 1 and 7 of the North Atlantic treaty. in this case, NAtO used 
military force against the ex-yugoslavia, without any armed attack of this country 
against NAtO and/or NAtO’s Member states and without any express authorization 
to do so by the u.N. security Council. in fact, in 1998, the security Council voted 
resolution 1199 (1998) in which it considered that the situation in kosovo is a threat 
to international peace and security and demanded an immediate cease-fire. however, 
it didn’t authorize u.N. Member states to use military force in the yugoslavian territory, 
25  Caroline affair, 1837.
26  By virtue of Article 43 of the u.N. Charter, u.N. Member states were supposed to put on disposal of the 
organization military stuffs and other facilities. Nevertheless, in practice when the security Council 
has authorized the use of armed force, he has left u.N. Member states or a coalition of u.N. Member 
states to deploy military operations, by their own.
27  the decision to implement a collective defense operation, based on Article 5 of the North Atlantic 
treaty, should be taken by consensus of all NAtO Member states. the consensus vote procedure 
actually grants a veto power to any Member state of NAtO, which can block the decision to apply 
Article 5. such a decision received the unanimous approval of all NAtO members on 12 september 
2001, a day after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the u.s. even if the armed attacks against the u.s. 
were perpetrated by a no state entity, the u.N. security Council considered that they amounted to an 
armed attack and justified the invocation of Article 51 of the u.N. Charter, and, ipso iure, of Article 5 
of the North Atlantic treaty.
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because of an imminent russian veto on this point. in response, NAtO began military 
air-strikes on civil and military objectives, located on the territory of ex-yugoslavia.28 
By so doing, NAtO’ Member states violated their duty “to refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes 
of the united Nations” (Art. 1 of the North Atlantic treaty). NAtO’s intervention in 
kosovo constituted a unilateral use of force and an act of aggression, contrary to 
Article 2(4) of the u.N. Charter. Consequently, it also constituted a violation of Article 7 
of the North Atlantic treaty. the illegality of NAtO’s actions in this conflict was sup-
posed to be covered by the concept of “humanitarian intervention,” which has 
nowadays involved into the “responsibility to protect” doctrine.29
the instrumentation of this doctrine and the negative effects of NAtO’s intervention 
in kosovo (increased number of refugees and civil victims of the conflict, intensification 
of the ethnic depuration, and difficulties to reconstruct a divided nation) were repeated 
during NAtO’s military operations in Libya, in 2011. Once again, NAtO’s actions in 
a third country constituted a violation of Article 7 of the North Atlantic treaty, as the 
use of military force was based on a resolution of the u.N. security Council, but NAtO 
clearly exceeded its terms. in fact, resolution 1973 (2011) determined
that the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya continues to constitute 
a threat to international peace and security
and authorized
Member states … acting nationally or through regional organizations 
or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the secretary-General, to 
take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 
(2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack 
in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign 
occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory …30
At the beginning, the military operation in Libya was led by a coalition of states 
(France, the u.s., and the uk) and it then passed on the command of NAtO. there 
were many proves that NAtO’s operations were not limited to protect civilians 
and included direct participation in the internal civil war, on behalf of one of the 
parties, through arms deliveries to the rebel groups and air-strikes against Gaddafi’s 
28  Bruno simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10(1) european Journal of international 
Law 1, 6–7 (1999).
29  ramesh thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to 
Protect (2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2017).
30  u.N. security Council, resolution 1973 (2011), s/res/1973 (2011), 17 March 2011, paras. 1 & 4 (Jul. 2, 
2020), available at https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/sres1973.pdf.
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government’s targets.31 China and russia protested against what they considered as 
an unlawful interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state and pointed out 
that NAtO had exceeded the limits of the u.N. security Council’s authorization to 
use military force.32 instead of protecting civilians from the atrocities of the civil war 
in Libya, NAtO used the “responsibility to protect” concept as an alibi to overturn 
the Gaddafi’s government and to sum Libya in chaos and no governability.33 the 
excess of NAtO in kosovo and Libya explains the extreme caution of russia and 
China, regarding new possible “interventionists” invocations of the “responsibility to 
protect” in u.N. security Council’s resolutions, and the no application of this concept 
to the syrian34 and/or venezuelan humanitarian catastrophes.
it is worthy to mention that NAtO’s interventions in kosovo and Libya were also 
contrary to some ius in bello (international humanitarian Law) rules.
NAtO’s actions during the kosovo crisis violated the Geneva Conventions on 
international humanitarian Law. in fact, during its bombing over the territory of 
ex-yugoslavia, NAtO’s targets were not only military, but also civilian. Air-strikes were 
conducted against bridges, hospitals, industrial plants, public and private buildings, 
as well as the headquarters of radio and television of serbia, killing more than 
300 civilians. NAtO also bombed chemical plants and oil installations, causing harms 
to the environment. the targeting of civilian and not only military objectives35 during 
a military conflict is inconsistent with the principle of distinction, which obligates 
military commanders to distinguish between military objectives and civilian persons 
or objects.36 the obligation not to cause harms to the environment is established in 
Article 35(3) of the Additional Protocol i to the Geneva Conventions37 and Article 55 of 
31  Libyan Rebels Target Gadhafi’s Birthplace, CNN, 29 March 2011 (Jul. 2, 2020), available at http://www.
cnn.com/2011/wOrLd/africa/03/28/libya.war/; Christian henderson, International Measures for the 
Protection of Civilians in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire, 60(3) international and Comparative Law Quarterly 767 
(2011); Ashely deeks, The NATO Intervention in Libya, virginia Public Law and Legal theory research 
Paper No. 2017-23 (2011) (Jul. 2, 2020), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2966122.
32  Andrew Jacobs, China Urges Quick End to Airstrikes in Libya, New york times, 22 March 2011 (Jul. 2, 2020), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/23/world/asia/23beiijing.html; deeks, supra note 31.
33  thakur 2017.
34  Id.
35  the most widely accepted definition of “military objective” is the one provided in Article 52 of the 
Additional Protocol i, which states:
"in so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their 
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or 
partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite 
military advantage."
36  this principle is expressed in Article 57 of the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions which 
obligates those who plan or decide upon an attack to “do everything feasible to verify that the 
objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects.”
37  According to this Article,
"it is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to 
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment."
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the Geneva Convention.38 After the end of the conflict, NAtO created a peacekeeping 
operation in kosovo. the kFOr was composed by 50,000 persons, from 36 countries, 
placed upon NAtO’s command.39 the kFOr personnel was directly involved in forced 
prostitution and human trafficking.40 human trafficking is a violation of provisions 
of international humanitarian Law41 and of international human rights Law,42 and 
forced prostitution is a violation of the rules of international Criminal Law.43
during NAtO’s operation in Libya there were indices, as well, of the violation 
of the ius ad bellum principle of distinction, due to the direction of the military air-
strikes against areas, with a big density of civilian population.44
to the repeated violations of Articles 1 and 7 of the North Atlantic treaty in kosovo 
and Libya should be added the current violation of Article 2 of this international 
agreement. According to Article 2,
the Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful 
and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, 
38  By virtue of this provision,
"1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term 
and severe damage. this protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare 
which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby 
to prejudice the health or survival of the population."
Final report to the Prosecutor by the Committee established to review the NAtO Bombing Campaign 
Against the Federal republic of yugoslavia, international Criminal tribunal for the former yugoslavia 
(Jul. 2, 2020), available at https://www.icty.org/en/press/final-report-prosecutor-committee-
established-review-nato-bombing-campaign-against-federal.
39  david Nauta, The International Responsibility of NATO and its Personnel During Military Operations 24 
(Leiden; Boston: Brill Nijhoff, 2018).
40  kosovo (serbia & Montenegro): “so does that Mean i have rights?”: Protecting the human rights of 
women and Girls trafficked for Forced Prostitution in kosovo, Amnesty international, 6 May 2004 (Jul. 2, 
2020), available at https://www.amnesty.org/download/documents/96000/eur700102004en.pdf; Barbara 
Limanowska; united Nations Children’s Fund, united Nations Office of the high Commissioner for human 
rights, Organization for security and Cooperation in europe/Office for democratic institutions and 
human rights, trafficking in human Beings in south eastern europe: 2004 – Focus on Prevention in: 
Albania, Bosnia and herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the former yugoslav republic of Macedonia, Moldova, 
romania, serbia and Montenegro, and the uN Administered Province of kosovo (March 2005) (Jul. 2, 
2020), available at https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/humantraffickinginsoutheasterneurope.pdf.
41  Arts. 49 & 146 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in time of war 
(Geneva Convention iv).
42  in this sense, Article 5 of the united Nations Convention against transnational Organized Crime obliges 
states to establish as criminal offences the participation in an organized criminal group and to enact 
legislation to criminalize the act of human trafficking.
43  Forced prostitution is a war crime and a crime against humanity, according to Articles 82 and 7(1)(g) 
of the rome statute of the international Criminal Court.
44  human rights watch, unacknowledged deaths: Civilian Casualties in NAtO’s Air Campaign in Libya, 14 May 
2012 (Jul. 2, 2020), available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/05/13/unacknowledged-deaths/civilian-
casualties-natos-air-campaign-libya; u.N. human rights Council, report of the international Commission of 
inquiry on Libya, 8 March 2012, A/hrC/19/68 (Jul. 2, 2020), available at https://www.ohchr.org/documents/
hrBodies/hrCouncil/regularsession/session19/A.hrC.19.68.pdf.
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by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these 
institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-
being. they will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies 
and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.
known as the “Canadian” article, this text gives testimony of NAtO’s (and other 
post-world war ii international institutions’) comprehensive approach to security, as 
encompassing not only the absence of “war,” but also the “economic peace” between 
nations.
the need to “eliminate conflict” in states’ international “economic policies,” as 
a condition for nations’ stability and well-being, is an historical legacy of the period 
prior to the beginning of world war ii. in fact, during the decade of 1930, many 
countries, including the u.s., developed preferential bilateralist tactics in international 
economy and trade. in this period, discriminatory trade blocs and protectionist trade 
agreements contributed to one of the most severe global trade contractions in the 
world economic history.45
Nowadays, these tactics seem to be back in NAtO’s Member states’ international 
trade policies. in fact, since his arrival at the white house, donald trump has 
favored a more active intervention of his Government in the volume and level of 
the united states’ trade exchanges with the rest of the world. in many of his public 
statements, trump blamed his trade partners of “taking advantage” of his country 
by “huge trade deficits,” depredatory and unfair trade practices.46 As response to these 
practices trump’s Foreign Policy offers a “more aggressive approach,” based on a neo-
protectionism in some strategic sectors of the u.s.’ economy.47 this neo-protectionism 
seeks to “encourage other countries to give u.s. producers fair and reciprocal access 
to their markets”48 and relies on the use of the most classical tool of this international 
45  the bourse crack of “the black thursday” and the devastation “debts” of world war i (hyperinflation, 
huge foreign debts, and high cost of the reconstruction, political and social instability) precipitated 
the “Great depression” in the united states and its sparrow all over the world. in response, the u.s. 
government adopted the famous smoot-hawley tariff Act in 1930, which increased the duties and tariffs 
on imports to the united states of more than 20,000 products. Many countries, like Canada, spain, italy 
and switzerland adopted direct retaliations, imposing tariff, and non- tariff trade barriers to u.s. exports. 
Other states, particularly, the uk, retailed indirectly and reduced trade barriers with other partners on 
a discriminatory basis. these protectionists and preferential trade policies conducted to the creation of 
“economic areas,” like the “sterling trade zone,” the “dollar bloc,” the “gold bloc” and the “Nazi bloc.” these 
blocs’ main objectives were to “empoorish the neighbor” and their direct result was a disintegration of 
international finance and trade. Francisco Comín Comín, Historia Económica Mundial: De los orígenes 
a la actualidad (Madrid: Alianza, 2011).
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trade policy: the tariffs. trump’s indiscriminate use of tariffs has led the entire world 
in a global “trade war.”49 in a legal perspective, trump’s neo-protectionist tariffs violate 
many rules and principles of international trade Law.50 But, at the same time, they 
constitute a violation to Article 2 of the North Atlantic treaty, as they only produce 
“conflict in the international economic policies” of NAtO’s Member states.
trump critics on economic and trade multilateralism are also affecting negatively 
the “economic collaboration between any or all of them” (Art. 2 of the North Atlantic 
treaty). Multilateral (economic) cooperation has been the basis for the negotiation 
of legal rules and principles of international (trade) Law and their embedment in 
international treaties, since the end of world war ii. Nevertheless, in trump’s Foreign 
Policy’s view, those legal norms are plagued by “bad deals,” that serve no more u.s.’ 
national interests and pose an obstacle to “Make America Great Again.” One of trump’s 
principal campaign promises was the re-negotiation and/or withdraw of the u.s. 
from many international multilateral trade agreements. After winning the elections, 
trump has been particularly consistent and has kept this promise.51 trump’s vision of 
international trade has clashed as well with wtO and the international multilateral 
trade system, as a whole.52
Finally, it is worth to mention that NAtO Member states are also violating Article 8 
of the North Atlantic treaty. According to this Article,
49  trade wars, trump tariffs and Protectionism explained, BBC, 10 May 2019 (Jul. 2, 2020), available at 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-43512098.
50  the abrupt increase in the tariffs is a direct and clear violation of rules established since the entry in force 
of the General Agreement on trade and tariffs (GAtt). in fact, the tariff concessions of wtO Member 
states figure in legal documents called “schedules of Concessions,” which record members’ specific 
commitments on tariffs and other concessions. these schedules thus provide security and predictability 
of market access for goods. wtO rules allow states to modify and renegotiate their tariff schedules 
under some restrictive conditions laid down in wtO law. however, they can’t misapply their schedules 
without previous modification of their commitments, unless they prove there is a legal reason to do so. 
Additionally, if states decide to elevate their tariffs regarding some wtO Member states, but not regarding 
all of them, they can incur in a violation of the most favored nation clause under GAtt Article i.
51  Few time after his arrival to the white house, President trump announced u.s.’ withdraw from the 
transpacific Partnership (tPP) and initiated the re-negotiation of the North American Free trade 
Agreement (NAFtA) with Mexico and Canada. At the same time, trump blocked the negotiations of 
the transatlantic Partnership (tAP) with the eu and the trade in services Agreement (tisA) with 24 other 
wtO members. Finally, trump’s Administration initiated a real “crusade” against another multilateral 
agreement, administered by the wtO: the dispute settlement Memorandum of understanding.
52  in many public speeches, President trump and robert Lighthizer–the u.s.’ trade representative–have 
expressed their “discontent” and “disappointment” with wtO. After the last wtO ministerial meeting 
in Buenos Aires, in 2017, Lighthizer mentioned that the united states is “concerned” because the wtO 
is losing its primary objectives and is becoming an organization, centered on disputes. in the same 
sense, during his official visit in vietnam, trump noticed that the u.s., “is not treated correctly” in the 
wtO. As a consequence, trump’s Administration blocked the nomination of arbiters at the Appellate 
Body of the dispute settlement Mechanism of the wtO. virdzhiniya Petrova Georgieva, La crisis de la 
Organización Mundial del Comercio: problemas e (im) posibles soluciones, 1(20) Anuario Mexicano de 
derecho internacional 25 (2020).
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each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in 
force between it and any other of the Parties or any third state is in conflict with 
the provisions of this treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international 
engagement in conflict with this treaty.
NAtO’s constitutive treaty is one the few international instruments that contains 
a “supremacy clause,” similar to the one established in Article 103 of the u.N. Charter.53 
however, Article 8 is narrower than Article 103.54
the first current violation of Article 8 of the North Atlantic treaty concerns the 
intention of some european NAtO Member states to go further with eu’s own 
defense system. even if the creation of a “european army” failed in 1954,55 the idea 
has never been abandoned completely and recently, some european leaders, 
particularly French President, emmanuel Macron, supported a “strong defense union 
between the ue Member states” and a further “european strategic autonomy” by the 
strengthening of the “european pillar of NAtO.”56 this proposal is based in the already 
existing legal regulations of a common european defense policy. in fact, according 
to Article 42(2) of the treaty on the european union, such a system can be adopted 
in the future by the organizations’ representative bodies and by its Member states.57 
53  By virtue of this Article,
"in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the united Nations under the 
present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations 
under the present Charter shall prevail."
54  First of all, the u.N. Charter uses the expression “international agreement,” while NAtO’s treaty refers to 
“international engagement.” An “international engagement” could create duties on behalf of states, by 
almost any means (international treaties, soft law arrangements, or even unilateral acts). “international 
agreement” has a more strict meaning and is generally used as synonym of an internationally binding 
instrument, such as treaty. On the second hand, Article 103 of the u.N. Charter only applies to already 
existing conflicts between the Charter and another agreement concluded by u.N. Member states, 
stating that in such a case, that the Charter will prevail, while Article 8 of the North Atlantic treaty 
establishes a more encompassing obligation upon NAtO’s Member states, prohibiting to them to 
enter into any future “international engagement” that can contradict their obligations under the 
NAtO’s constitutive treaty.
55  A draft treaty signed by the Governments of Belgium, France, italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
the Federal republic of Germany in 1954 was trying to create a european army, placed under NAtO’s 
command. the treaty never entered into force, because it was rejected by the French Government. 
european defense: the Challenge of strategic Autonomy, sénat (Jul. 2, 2020), available at http://www.
senat.fr/rap/r18-626-2/r18-626-22.html#fn5.
56  Macron says NAtO is experiencing ‘Brain death’ Because of trump, New york times, 7 November 2019 
(Jul. 2, 2020), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/07/world/europe/macron-nato-brain-
death.html.
57  By virtue of Article 42(2),
"the common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common union 
defence policy. this will lead to a common defence, when the european Council, acting unanimously, 
so decides. it shall in that case recommend to the Member states the adoption of such a decision in 
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements."
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the same Article contains a direct reference to Article 8 of the North Atlantic treaty, 
as it seeks to guarantee the compatibility of a possible eu common defense system 
with “security and defense policy established” within the framework of NAtO.58 
Nevertheless, the creation of an eu common defense system will be difficult to 
reconcile with Member states’ obligations under the North Atlantic treaty and the 
possibility of future conflicts between the two institutional frameworks should not 
be under estimated. even if the eu Member states’ don’t possess the financial and 
infrastructural capacities to build their own common defense system and are heavily 
relying on u.s. military supremacy to defend the security within the eu borders,59 the 
fact that the “collective security clause,” established in Article 42(7) of the treaty on 
the european union60 has already been activated after the terrorist attacks against 
France in 2015,61 without having any recourse to Article 5 of the North Atlantic treaty, 
shows the political will of the eu countries to increase their solidarity and strategic 
objectives more within the eu and less within NAtO.
Another possible violation of Article 8 of the North Atlantic treaty is turkey’s 
unilateral “engagements” towards russia. in fact, turkey has bought arms from russia 
and has showed willingness to further its strategic cooperation with this country in 
many areas.62 these decisions were taken in complete autonomy and without any 
consultation with NAtO’s Member states, even if they clearly represent an engagement 
that can contradict turkey’s obligations by virtue of the North Atlantic treaty.
58  According to Article 42(2),
"the policy of the union in accordance with this section shall not prejudice the specific character of 
the security and defence policy of certain Member states and shall respect the obligations of certain 
Member states, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic treaty Organisation 
(NAtO), under the North Atlantic treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence 
policy established within that framework."
59  As the French senate has pointed out, the united states devotes 3.4% of its GdP to defense, i.e. $605 
billion, which is equal to two-thirds of the military expenditure of all NAtO countries combined. within 
this gigantic u.s. military budget, spending specifically devoted to the defense of europe is estimated at 
$35.8 billion in 2018, or 6% of the total, which is almost as much as the entire defense budget of France 
(€35.9 billion in 2019). european defence: the Challenge of strategic Autonomy, supra note 55.
60  this Article provides:
"if a Member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member states shall have 
towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 
51 of the united Nations Charter. this shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense 
policy of certain Member states. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with 
commitments under the North Atlantic treaty Organization, which, for those states which are members 
of it, remains the foundation of their collective defense and the forum for its implementation."
61  european Parliament resolution of 21 January 2016 on the mutual defence clause (Article 42(7) 
teu) (2015/3034(rsP)) (Jul. 2, 2020), available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/eN/
tXt/?uri=CeLeX%3A52016iP0019.
62  relations Between russia and turkey, rep. of turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Jul. 2, 2020), available 
at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-russian-federation.en.mfa.
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2. The Lack of Negative Legal Consequences of NATO’s Internationally 
Unlawful Behavior
2.1. The Irresponsibility of NATO
the above mentioned violations of the North Atlantic treaty, as well as the 
violations of ius in bello and ius at bellum rules are, in international law, internationally 
wrongful acts.63 the subjects of international law, i.e. the entities endowed with 
international legal personality, are internationally responsible for these acts and 
must repair the damages caused to their victims.
NAtO is an international intergovernmental organization that possess 
international legal personality.64 Although NAtO’s constitutive treaty is silent 
about this question,65 its legal personality can be determined according to the 
“test,” developed by the international Court of Justice (iCJ) in the Reparations for 
Injuries case.66 NAtO’s capacity to celebrate international treaties with states and 
with other subjects of international law is another factual proof of its international 
legal personality.67
63  A violation of an obligation, incumbent to a subject of international law by virtue of a conventional 
or customary norm or principle of international law constitutes an internationally wrongful act that 
can compromise its international legal responsibility. By virtue of Article 2 of the international Law 
Commission’s draft Articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful Acts,
"there is an internationally wrongful act of a state when conduct consisting of an action or omission:
(a) is attributable to the state under international law; and
(b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the state."
64  Allain Pellet, L’imputabilité d’éventuels actes illicites: Responsabilité de l’OTAN ou des États membres in 
Kosovo and the International Community: A Legal Assessment 193, 198 (C. tomuschat (ed.), the hague: 
kluwer, 2002).
65  Other constitutive treaties of international organizations expressly confer international legal personality 
to the created entity (see Art. 47 of the treaty on the european union, Art. 34 of the Asunción treaty, 
establishing the Mercosur, Art. 176 of the u.N. Convention on the Law of the sea, for example).
66  Concerning the international legal personality of NAtO, the iCJ considered that
"it must be acknowledged that its Members, by entrusting certain functions to it, with the attendant 
duties and responsibilities, have clothed it with the competence required to enable those functions 
to be effectively discharged. … in the opinion of the Court, the Organization was intended to exercise 
and enjoy, and is in fact exercising and enjoying, functions and rights which can only be explained 
on the basis of the possession of a large measure of international personality and the capacity to 
operate upon an international plane."
in this sense, by the signature of the North Atlantic treaty, NAtO’s Member states have entrusted 
to the organization duties and responsibilities, regarding the establishment of a collective self-
defense system within its framework. NAtO is, thus, exercising and enjoying duties and rights that 
are necessary for the fulfillment of its statutory objectives.
67  thus, for example, NAtO has concluded sOFA agreements, regarding the status of its military 
personnel and headquarters on the territory of Member states or no members of the organization. 
these agreements set up the general terms and conditions of the cooperation between the alliance 
and the host countries.
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Consequently, NAtO can be, in principle, held responsible for its internationally 
wrongful acts. however, NAtO is a legal person–a fiction for (international) law–
and it can only act by representation of its organs and agents. Article 6(1) of the 
international Law Commission’s draft Articles on the responsibility of international 
Organizations states:
1. the conduct of an organ or agent of an international organization in 
the performance of functions of that organ or agent shall be considered an 
act of that organization under international law, whatever position the organ 
or agent holds in respect of the organization.
thus, in principle, the internationally wrongful acts committed by agents and 
organs of NAtO can be attributed to the organization.
Although the question of attribution of responsibility is particularly complex 
in the case of NAtO, as many of its agents are also agents of Member states of the 
organization,68 what is really causing problems is the inexistence of instances where 
NAtO’s international responsibility can be invoked.
states’ responsibility under international law can be alleged in proceedings before 
the iCJ. A state, victim of the internationally wrongful act, committed by another 
state, can bring a demand against the second before the “world court” and try to 
obtain reparation for the prejudice it has suffered. in contrast, NAtO’s international 
responsibility can’t be invoked before the iCJ, because the alliance doesn’t possess 
locus standi and can’t participate, as claimant or defendant, in the resolution of the 
contentious cases brought to the Court’s jurisdiction. the resolution of this type of 
disputes by the iCJ is exclusively reserved to states.69
No other international tribunal has competence to pronounce itself on questions 
relating to NAtO’s international responsibility.
the international human rights tribunals can hear demands on state’s international 
responsibility in the human rights field. the majority of these demands are initiated 
by individuals against their national states, but it is also possible for a state to institute 
proceedings against another state, before a human rights tribunal.70 Few time ago, 
it would be difficult to envisage cases instituted against international organizations 
68  Nauta 2018.
69  By virtue of Article 34(1) of the statute of the international Court of Justice,
"Only states may be parties in cases before the Court."
70  According to Article 33 of the european Convention on human rights,
"Any high Contracting Party may refer to the Court any alleged breach of the provisions of the 
Convention and the Protocols thereto by another high Contracting Party."
in the same sense, Article 61 of the American Convention on human rights provides:
"Only the states Parties and the Commission shall have the right to submit a case to the Court."
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before this type of international judicial bodies. however, the accession of the eu to 
the european Convention on human rights has opened the possibility for individuals 
to apply to the european Court of human rights (eCthr) to review the legality of the 
acts of this international organization. in contrast, NAtO is not a part to international 
human rights treaties and has not showed its willingness to submit itself to the 
jurisdiction of any international human rights tribunal.
the possible breaches of international Criminal Law by NAtO can’t be submitted 
to the jurisdiction of the international criminal tribunals. these judicial bodies are 
only entitled to determine the international criminal responsibility of individuals 
for the commission of international crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
genocide and crime of aggression). thus, they have jurisdiction over acts, committed 
by NAtO’s agents, qua individuals, but not over violations of international Criminal 
Law, attributed to NAtO, qua international organization.
until now, no state or other subject of international law has presented any 
demand against NAtO, for violations of international law, before an international 
tribunal. in the same sense, NAtO has never brought proceedings against any other 
international law subject in the fora of an international judicial body.71 NAtO seems 
to be placed completely outside of the scope of justice in international law.
domestic tribunals are also entitled to act as “international law judges” and to use 
international law as a legal basis for the resolution of the cases, brought before their 
jurisdiction. thus, for example, individuals can demand their national states before 
domestic tribunals, invoking the violation of an international treaty that affords rights 
and duties to private persons.72 however an international organization, such as NAtO, 
can’t appear in domestic judicial proceedings. NAtO (and all the other international 
institutions) enjoys immunity from jurisdiction for acts performed in the course of 
71  Nauta 2018, at 107.
72  there are several areas in which international law grants direct rights and duties to individuals. Many 
international norms and principles, applicable at the regional and universal level, protect the rights of 
some categories of individuals (refugees, stateless persons or workers) and the human rights of all private 
persons. Additionally, some regional human rights courts (like the european Court of human rights) 
have considered companies to enjoy a limited number of human rights. Private persons can invoke their 
human rights before international bodies (some u.N. bodies are competent in human rights protection) 
and before specialized regional courts and tribunals (like the european Court of human rights, the 
inter-American Court of human rights or the African Court of human rights). All international human 
rights instruments establish the exhaustion of local remedies as a prerequisite for international judicial 
protection. thus the ordinary, and primary, responsibility to protect international human rights belongs to 
national judges. domestic judges can act not only as protectors of individual human rights, as granted by 
international law, but also as guarantors of the international duties of an individual. At present, individuals 
are active subjects of international human rights Law and passive subjects of international Criminal Law. 
According to the norms and principles of this specialized branch of international law, individuals have 
the obligation not to commit so-called international crimes, such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and crime of aggression. All domestic judges are vested with the authority to perform the 
so-called “universal jurisdiction” and the national tribunals of states that have ratified the rome statute 
are, by virtue of its provisions, complementary judges to the international Criminal Court.
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its functions. unless NAtO expressly admits a waiver of immunity, litigants cannot 
initiate legal proceedings against the organization before a domestic tribunal. this 
“procedural barrier” is justified by the need to guarantee the efficient fulfillment 
of the objectives and aims, assigned to the organization by its foundational treaty, 
and to preserve its neutrality and independence vis-à-vis NAtO’s Member states. 
the jurisdictional immunity of NAtO is established in Article 5 of the Agreement on 
the status of the North Atlantic treaty Organization, National representatives and 
international staff, signed in Ottawa in 1951.73 this explains why there are no cases 
brought against this organization before national tribunals. NAtO has only been 
judged and declared guilty in absentia by a serbian tribunal, located in Belgrade, 
but this case has more a symbolical than a legal value.74
the lack of jurisdiction of international tribunals and NAtO’s immunity before 
domestic tribunals produce as result the impossibility for a judicial body (internal 
or international) to determine NAtO’s international responsibility. therefore, 
NAtO’s responsibility cannot by established by legal means and the victims of an 
internationally wrongful act, committed by this organization, don’t have access 
to justice, in order to obtain reparation for the suffered prejudice(s). even, if in 
strict terms, NAtO is internationally responsible, the lack of judicial mechanisms 
for the establishment of that responsibility grants to this institution, a de facto, 
irresponsibility and a secured impunity in international (and domestic) law. in other 
words, NAtO is allowed to violate international law, without assuming any negative 
legal consequences for its internationally unlawful behavior.
the current legal status of NAtO is a severe violation of the “right to trial,” as 
a human right of the victims of its internationally wrongful acts. According to Article 
6 of the european Convention on human rights:
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time 
by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
in Waite and Kennedy and Beer and Regan cases,75 the eCthr considered that the 
right to trial might suffer limitations in cases presented against an international 
73  According to Article 5,
"the Organization, its property and assets, wheresoever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy 
immunity from every form of legal process except in so far as in any particular case the Chairman of 
the Council deputies, acting on behalf of the Organization, may expressly authorize the waiver of 
this immunity. it is however, understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of 
execution or detention of property."
74  Andreas Laursen, NATO, the War over Kosovo, and the ICTY Investigation, 17(4) American university 
international Law review 765, 770 (2002).
75  eCthr, Beer and Regan v. Germany, Appl. No. 28934/95, Judgment, 18 February 1999, para. 59; eCthr, 
Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, Appl. No. 26083/94, Judgment, 18 February 1999, para. 68.
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organization before a domestic tribunal, only if there are “alternative means” for the 
protection of the victims’ human rights. in the case of NAtO, such alternative means 
don’t exist. the only internal judicial body to NAtO is its Administrative tribunal, 
but its jurisdiction is limited over labor law disputes opposing the organization to 
its personnel.76
2.2. The Irresponsibility of NATO’s Member States
NAtO’s Member states can also be held responsible for the internationally 
wrongful acts, committed by their agents and/or organs during the alliance’s military 
(and/or peacekeeping) operations. By virtue of Article 1 of the iLC draft Articles on 
the responsibility of states for internationally wrongful Acts,
every internationally wrongful act of a state entails the international 
responsibility of that state.
According to Article 2,
there is an internationally wrongful act of a state when conduct consisting 
of an action or omission:
(a) is attributable to the state under international law; and
(b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the state.
thus, the responsibility of NAtO’s Member states can arise from acts committed 
by their agents during NAtO’s military operations. NAtO’s members voluntarily put 
these agents under the command of the organization, but they still can exercise some 
type of control over their activities.77 the generally accepted criteria to determine 
to whom the acts of NAtO’s personnel should be legally attributed is the “effective 
control” test.78 states can only be held responsible for internationally wrongful acts, 
committed by agents of NAtO, during operations lead by this organization, if these 
agents were placed under states’ effective control.
the international responsibility of NAtO’s Member states’ can be determined in 
such cases by international tribunals.
As mentioned above, the iCJ has jurisdiction over interstate demands on res-
ponsibility for internationally wrongful acts, committed by state agents during 
an official function. in contrast with the number of breaches of international law 
76  NAtO Administrative tribunal, NAtO (Jul. 2, 2020), available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
topics_114072.htm.
77  Nauta 2018.
78  Nicaragua v. United States of America, supra note 20; iCty, Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić aka “Dule,” it-94-
1-t, 7 May 1997.
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committed by NAtO, there is, so far, only one case brought against NAtO’s Member 
states on this ground. in the Legality of Use of Force cases, yugoslavia instituted 
proceedings against eight NAtO’s Member states (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, 
italy, Netherlands, Portugal, spain, the united kingdom, and the united states of 
America), invoking violations of their obligation not to use force against another 
state. in particular, yugoslavia alleged breaches of the prohibition to use military force 
in international relations, violations of the principle of no intervention in domestic 
affairs, and of the obligations to protect civilian population and civilian installations 
during armed conflicts.79 the Court decided to join the eight cases, and finally declared 
that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve them, as serbia and Montenegro–the state that 
succeeded to the ex-yugoslavia–was not a state party to the statute of the Court at 
the time of the institution of the proceedings.80 At the end of its reasoning, the Court 
added that, irrespective of whether it has jurisdiction over the dispute, the parties 
“remain in all cases responsible for acts attributable to them that violate the rights of 
other states.”81 this unfortunate consideration shows that the Court was completely 
aware of the effect of its decision not to exam the merits of the case: the de facto 
irresponsibility of NAtO’s Member states for possible violations of international law 
during NAtO’s military actions against the ex-yugoslavia.
the eCthr has been another international tribunal that had the opportunity to 
determine NAtO’s Member states’ international responsibility in the human rights 
field. in the Behrami and Saramati cases,82 a demand against three NAtO Member 
states (France, Germany, and Norway) was brought before the Court, for acts 
committed by the kFOr in the territory of kosovo.83 the eCthr considered that the 
acts committed by kFOr agents had to be attributed to the u.N., not to NAtO, nor 
to its Member states.84 As a consequence, it didn’t review their compatibility with 
the european Convention on human rights. in the same sense, in the Banković 
79  iCJ, Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. France), Application instituting proceedings, filed in the registry 
of the Court on 29 April 1999 (Jul. 2, 2020), available at https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/107/ 
7159.pdf.
80  iCJ, Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain), overview of the case (Jul. 2, 2020), available at https://
www.icj-cij.org/en/case/112.
81  Id.
82  eCthr, Behrami and Behrami v. France, Appl. No. 71412/01, Saramati v. France, Germany, and Norway, 
Appl. No. 78166/01, Grand Chamber decision (Admissibility), 2 May 2007, para. 43.
83  in the Behrami case, two boys were playing with undetonated bombs, placed by NAtO in the Mitrovica 
region. One died and the other was badly injured. in the Saramati case, Mr. saramati was arrested by 
agents of uNMik, by orders of kFOr, in violation of his human rights under the european Convention 
on human rights.
84  kFOr was placed under the command of NAtO, but NAtO itself had to submit itself to the resolutions of 
the u.N. security Council, which had the “ultimate authority” over the peacekeeping mission in kosovo. 
Behrami and Behrami v. France & Saramati v. France, Germany, and Norway, supra note 82, para. 133.
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case,85 family members of the victims of NAtO’s bombing over the buildings of 
the National radio and television of serbia, instituted proceedings against all the 
european NAtO’s Member states for violation of the european Convention on human 
rights. the eCthr considered that it lacked jurisdiction to exam the merits of the 
case, as the Convention could not be applied extra-territorially and the ex-yugoslavia 
was not member of the treaty at the time of the facts.86 Both cases show a lack of 
political will of the eCthr to open the merits of cases concerning human rights 
violations committed by NAtO’s Member states. the result was the same as the one 
reached by the iCJ in the Legality of Use of Force case: the, de facto, irresponsibility of 
NAtO’s Member states for alleged internationally wrongful acts, committed during 
its peacekeeping and military operations.
the victims of NAtO Member states’ violations of international law could seek 
justice before the domestic tribunals. however, by virtue of the customary principle 
pars in parem non habet jurisdictionem, states enjoy an immunity from jurisdiction 
before the domestic tribunals of other states. the immunity is limited to the de 
iure imperii acts of state–acts that imply the use of state’s public and sovereign 
prerogatives. the decision to participate in an international military operation, 
commanded by NAtO, can be easily categorized as a de iure imperii act, being the 
defense and security’s objectives intimately close to state’s sovereignty. if a domestic 
tribunal of a state accepts to judge a Member state of NAtO for alleged violations 
of international law, the second can bring an international claim against the first, 
invoking its international responsibility for the violation of the customary rules of 
international law that recognize its jurisdictional immunity.87
the last option for the victims of NAtO’s internationally wrongful acts would 
be to demand NAtO’s Member states before their own tribunals. in the first place, 
this would imply additional costs that many victims would not be in conditions to 
undertake. Additionally, as e. Benvenisti shows,88 when the application of international 
norms by national courts is sought in an attempt to constrain the activities of the 
executive branch, domestic judges might be more timid and reluctant regarding 
their potential in the international arena.89 the tendency for domestic judges to rule 
85  eCthr, Banković and others v. Belgium and 16 other Contracting States, Appl. No. 52207/99, Grand 
Chamber decision (Admissibility), 12 december 2001.
86  Consequently, the victims were not placed “within the jurisdiction” of a Contracting Party of the 
Convention and the conditions for its application were not met according to its Article 1.
87  As the Jurisdictional Immunity of the State case (Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: 
Greece intervening), Judgment, i.C.J. reports 2012, p. 99) shows, the iCJ is still considering that states’ 
immunities under international law are essential for the peaceful coexistence of nations, and that 
they allow no exceptions, even for acts that constitute violations of ius cogens rules.
88  eyal Benvenisti, Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of International Law: An Analysis of 
Attitudes of National Courts, 4(2) european Journal of international Law 159 (1993).
89  Id. at 161.
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on international law issues in favor of the interests of their own government has 
been a driving force behind the creation of various international dispute settlement 
mechanisms.90 these elements determine the little chance of success of the demands, 
brought by victims of NAtO’s Member states’ unlawful behavior before their own 
domestic tribunals. the Presidency of the Council of Ministers v. Marković case91 is very 
significant in this regard. in this case, familiars of the victims of NAtO bombing upon 
the buildings of the National radio and television of serbia instituted proceedings 
against italy, alleging violations of the norms of international humanitarian Law. the 
italian Corte di Cassazione found that the choice of methods of warfare was to be 
regarded as “an act of government” that manifests a political function, with respect 
to which no judicial review was admissible.92
Finally, it is worthy to mention that if the victims of NAtO’s Member states’ 
internationally unlawful acts decide to demand not the states themselves, but 
directly their agents before domestic tribunals, the lawsuits would probably not 
proceed. in the first place, most part of Member states’ personnel, participating 
in NAtO’s missions is military and, in domestic legal orders, only subject to the 
jurisdiction of military tribunals, which can render an exceptional type of justice. in 
the second place, domestic tribunals of the state could not be independent from 
their Government. in the third place, NAtO’s agents also enjoy an immunity from 
jurisdiction before domestic tribunals. this immunity is recognized in the Agreement 
between the Parties to the North Atlantic treaty regarding the status of their Forces, 
19 June 1951 (NAtO sOFA).93
90  One of the main reasons for the success of international commercial and investment arbitration is 
the fact that arbiters are not state agents and are supposed to be more independent than national 
judges are when they apply or interpret international law. in the same sense, the international Center 
for settlement of investment disputes (iCsid) Convention expressly provides for a non-application 
of the rule of exhaustion of local remedies in international investment arbitration cases. the NAFtA 
arbitration system and the creation of international courts and tribunals, casts doubt on the ability 
of domestic judges to preserve the efficacy of the norms and objectives of international law when it 
goes against the will of their own government.
91  Corte di Cassazione, Presidency of the Council of Ministers v. Marković and others, 85 rivista di diritto 
internazionale 799 (2002).
92  International Law in Domestic Courts: A Casebook 30 (A. Nollkaemper et al. (eds.), Oxford: Oxford 
university Press, 2018).
93  According to Article vii of this Agreement,
"1. subject to the provisions of this Article,
a. the military authorities of the sending state shall have the right to exercise within the receiving 
state all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the law of the sending state over 
all persons subject to the military law of that state;
b. the authorities of the receiving state shall have jurisdiction over the members of a force or civilian 
component and their dependents with respect to offences committed within the territory of the 
receiving state and punishable by the law of that state.
RUSSIAN LAw JOURNAL     Volume VIII (2020) Issue 3 56
2.3. The International Criminal Irresponsibility of NATO’s Personnel
the international Criminal tribunals were created in order to bring to 
justice persons, responsible for the commission of crimes than have shaken the 
conscience and the core values of the international community, as a whole.94 One 
of the revolutions of contemporary international law was the establishment of the 
international criminal responsibility of individuals. two ad hoc international criminal 
tribunals–the international Criminal tribunal for the ex-yugoslavia (iCty) and the 
international Criminal tribunal for rwanda (iCtr)–received jurisdiction to investigate 
and prosecute international crimes committed during the conflicts that took place in 
these countries. in 2003, the rome statute created the international Criminal Court 
(iCC)–a permanent international tribunal–competent to determine the international 
criminal responsibility of individuals that have committed international crimes in 
the territory of one of its Member states.
As mentioned above, NAtO’s personnel has been implicated in the commission 
of violations of the norms and principles of international Criminal Law. some of 
them were committed on the territory of the ex-yugoslavia and clearly entered in 
the jurisdiction of the iCty.95
2. a. the military authorities of the sending state shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction 
over persons subject to the military law of that state with respect to offences, including offences relating 
to its security, punishable by the law of the sending state, but not by the law of the receiving state.
b. the authorities of the receiving state shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over members 
of a force or civilian component and their dependents with respect to offences, including offences relating 
to the security of that state, punishable by its law but not by the law of the sending state."
94  According to the famous quotation of the Nuremberg tribunals,
"international law imposes duties upon individuals as well as upon states; crimes against international 
law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit 
such crimes can the provisions of international be enforced."
95  According to Article 1 of the statute of the international Criminal tribunal for the former yugoslavia,
"the international tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former yugoslavia 
since 1991 in accordance with the provisions of the present statute."
NAtO’s personnel’s actions were committed on that territory, in 1999. regarding the tribunal’s material 
competence, Article 2 of the statute, states the following:
"the international tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons committing or ordering to be 
committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely the following acts 
against persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention: …
(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried 
out unlawfully and wantonly."
the destruction of civil property and the civilian victims of NAtO’s bomb dropping on the territory 
of the ex-yugoslavia could be considered as a violation of this Article. in the same sense, by virtue 
of Article 3,
"the international tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons violating the laws or customs of 
war. such violations shall include, but not be limited to: … (c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever 
means, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings;
(d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and 
education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science."
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the iCty established a special committee to review NAtO’s bombing campaign 
against the ex-yugoslavia. in a report to iCty’s Prosecutor, Carla del Ponte,96 the 
committee analyzed the existence of possible harms to the environment, due to 
the bombardment and destruction of industrial and chemical infrastructure and the 
consequent release of dangerous materials in the environment, and studied their 
compatibility with the rules of the Additional Protocol i to the Geneva Conventions.97 
the Committee also appreciated the legality of NAtO’s targeting on civil objectives 
in regard of the relevant rules of international humanitarian Law and international 
Criminal Law.98 At the end of its report, the Committee concluded that
On the basis of information available, the committee recommends that 
no investigation be commenced by the OtP in relation to the NAtO bombing 
campaign or incidents occurring during the campaign.99
Consequently, in 2000, iCty’s Prosecutor, Carla del Ponte, “decided not to open 
a criminal investigation into any aspect of NAtO’s 1999 air campaign against the 
Federal republic of yugoslavia.”100 in her memoir, Carla del Ponte, admits, that her 
efforts to open an investigation against NAtO were “ultimately overshadowed by 
a sense of futility,” and confesses:
this Article’s scope encompasses NAtO’s bombing on historic monuments, such as bridges over the 
Belgrade’s part of the danube river and the bombardment of the buildings of the National radio 
and television of serbia.
96  Final report to the Prosecutor by the Committee established to review the NAtO Bombing Campaign 
Against the Federal republic of yugoslavia, supra note 38.
97  the basic legal provisions applicable to protection of the environment in armed conflict are Article 35(3) 
of the Additional Protocol i, which states that
"it is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to 
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment"
and Article 55 which states:
"1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-
term and severe damage. this protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of 
warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment 
and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population.
2. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited."
98  in brief, in combat military commanders are required: a) to direct their operations against military 
objectives, and b) when directing their operations against military objectives, to ensure that the losses 
to the civilian population and the damage to civilian property are not disproportionate to the concrete 
and direct military advantage anticipated. Attacks which are not directed against military objectives 
(particularly attacks directed against the civilian population) and attacks which cause disproportionate 
civilian casualties or civilian property damage may constitute the actus reus for the offence of unlawful 
attack under Article 3 of the iCty statute. Final report to the Prosecutor by the Committee established 
to review the NAtO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal republic of yugoslavia, supra note 38.
99  Id.
100  Prosecutor’s report on the NAtO Bombing Campaign, Press release, international Criminal tribunal 
for the former yugoslavia, 13 June 2000 (Jul. 2, 2020), available at https://www.icty.org/en/press/
prosecutors-report-nato-bombing-campaign.
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i understood that i had collided with the edge of the political universe in 
which the tribunal was allowed to function. … And my advisors warned me 
that investigating NAtO would be impossible.101
in spite of the statutory independence of the iCty’s Prosecutor, the violations of 
international humanitarian Law and international Criminal Law allegedly committed by 
NAtO’s personnel during the intervention in the ex-yugoslavia were never investigated 
by this ad hoc tribunal. the fact that it was created by a resolution of the u.N. security 
Council and that 3 of its 5 permanent members are NAtO’s Member states settled an 
unsurmountable political obstacle for the investigation. the result was once again 
the de facto international criminal irresponsibility of individuals, placed upon NAtO’s 
command during the military operation in the ex-yugoslavia.
individual members of NAtO’s personnel, allegedly involved in the commission 
of international crimes, could also be prosecuted by the iCC. By virtue of the rome 
statute, the Court has jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide 
and crime of aggression. the pre-requisites for the exercise of the iCC’s jurisdiction are 
established in Article 12 of the statute.102 even if there have been intents to refer to the 
iCC the commission of international crimes by NAtO’s personnel, no investigation has 
been opened on that ground, because of the difficulty to prove that this requirements 
are met. in this sense, for example, in 2012, russia called on the iCC to investigate 
the commission of war crimes during NAtO’s bombing campaign in Libya,103 but the 
investigation was never opened, because Libya, the state on which territory the alleged 
crimes took place, is not a party to the rome statute and some of the states, of which 
NAtO’s personnel’s members are nationals, are either parties to this treaty, particularly 
the u.s. in contrast, Judges of iCC’s Pre-trial Chamber i did issued warrants of arrest for 
Muammar Gaddafi, saif al-islam Gaddafi, and Abdullah al-senussi for crimes against 
humanity.104 in the same sense, NAtO’s missions in other countries, such as Afghanistan, 
had never been submitted to the scrutiny of the iCC. however, this could change in the 
future, following the recent and historic decision of the iCC to open an investigation 
101  Carla del Ponte & Chuck sudetic, Madame Prosecutor: Confrontations with Humanity’s Worst Criminals 
and the Culture of Impunity: A Memoir 58 (New york: Other Press, 2009).
102  "1. A state which becomes a Party to this statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with 
respect to the crimes referred to in Article 5.
2. in the case of Article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more 
of the following states are Parties to this statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in 
accordance with paragraph 3:
(a) the state on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was committed 
on board a vessel or aircraft, the state of registration of that vessel or aircraft;
(b) the state of which the person accused of the crime is a national."
103  russia urges NAtO to investigate Libyan deaths, rt, 20 december 2011 (Jul. 2, 2020), available at 
https://www.rt.com/russia/russia-libya-nato-investigation-un-217/.
104  international Criminal Court, third report of the Prosecutor of the international Criminal Court to the 
uN security Council Pursuant to uNsCr 1970 (2011) (Jul. 2, 2020), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/
Nr/rdonlyres/d313B617-6A86-4d64-88Ad-A89375C18FB9/0/uNsCreportLibyaMay2012eng.pdf.
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against the u.s. and Afghanistan, for the alleged commission of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity during the u.s. war on Afghanistan, in 2003.105
Finally, it’s worthy to mention that a situation, implicating the commission of 
international crimes can be referred to the iCC, directly, by the u.N. security Council. 
however, the paradox of this referral is that the Council can refer the nationals of other 
states to the iCC, but never the nationals of its 5 permanent members, 3 of which are 
members of NAtO, because of their veto power during the referral proceeding. this paradox 
is another strong guarantee for NAtO’s personnel international criminal irresponsibility.
2.4. The Impossibility to Impose Sanctions to NATO and its Member States on 
the Basis of the North Atlantic Treaty and Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
As mentioned above, NAtO has established strict conditions for the admission of 
states to the organization. however, the North Atlantic treaty doesn’t contain any type 
of disciplinary sanctions that can be imposed to a NAtO Member state, if it violates 
this constitutive treaty and/or other international law norms and principles. Other 
treaties, establishing international organizations, provide mechanisms and sanctions 
that can be applied in such cases. thus, for example, the Articles of Agreement of the 
international Monetary Fund include the imposition of sanctions against Member states 
that don’t respect the obligations incumbent on them by virtue of this agreement. 
the sanctions include the publication of public reports with sensible information on 
countries’ economic situation,106 the negative to afford financial assistance and credits 
to the state that has failed to fulfil its international obligations,107 the suspension of its 
voting rights,108 and, ultimately, its expulsion from the organization.109
105  iCC Authorises investigation into Alleged Afghanistan war Crimes, Aljazeera, 5 March 2020 (Jul. 2, 
2020), available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/icc-authorises-investigation-alleged-
afghanistan-war-crimes-200305101406253.html.
106  By virtue of Article Xii, section 8 of the Articles of Agreement of the international Monetary Fund,
"the Fund may, by a seventy percent majority of the total voting power, decide to publish a report 
made to a member regarding its monetary or economic conditions and developments which directly 
tend to produce a serious disequilibrium in the international balance of payments of members. if 
the member is not entitled to appoint an executive director, it shall be entitled to representation in 
accordance with section 3(j) of this Article. the Fund shall not publish a report involving changes in 
the fundamental structure of the economic organization of members."
107  According to Article XXvi, section 2(a) of the Articles of Agreement of the iMF,
"if a member fails to fulfill any of its obligations under this Agreement, the Fund may declare the 
member ineligible to use the general resources of the Fund. Nothing in this section shall be deemed 
to limit the provisions of Article v, section 5 or Article vi, section 1."
108  Article XXvi, section 2(b) of the Articles of Agreement of the iMF states:
"if, after the expiration of a reasonable period following a declaration of ineligibility under (a) above, 
the member persists in its failure to fulfill any of its obligations under this Agreement, the Fund may, 
by a seventy percent majority of the total voting power, suspend the voting rights of the member. 
during the period of the suspension, the provisions of schedule L shall apply. the Fund may, by 
a seventy percent majority of the total voting power, terminate the suspension at any time."
109  Article XXvi, section 2(c) of the Articles of Agreement of the iMF establishes that
"if, after the expiration of a reasonable period following a decision of suspension under (b) above, 
the member persists in its failure to fulfill any of its obligations under this Agreement, that member 
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the silence of the North Atlantic treaty regarding the possibility to impose 
sanctions or to expulse a Member state doesn’t mean, in the first place, that this 
country is not allowed to withdraw from the organization and denunciate the 
agreement.110 in the second place, the silence of the North Atlantic treaty on this point, 
could be interpreted in the light of the text of the vienna Convention on the Law of 
treaties. By virtue of Article 60 of the Convention, it is possible to invoke a material 
breach of a multilateral treaty as a ground for the termination or the suspension of 
its operation, in whole or in part.111 however, it is necessary to prove that this material 
breach is resulting from “the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment 
of the object or purpose of the treaty” and the decision to suspend or terminate the 
treaty should be taken by “unanimous agreement” of the parties. in NAtO’s case, it will 
probably not be difficult to prove that many Member states have violated essential 
provisions of the treaty, such as its Articles 1, 2, 7 or 8. however, the “unanimous 
agreement” of the other Member states would pose much more difficulties.
Finally, it is worthy to mention that the violation of the ius cogens rules that prohibit 
the use of military force in international law can justify the imposition of sanctions 
against a state that has violated Article 2(4) of the u.N. Charter. in fact, Chapter vii of 
the Charter authorizes the u.N. security Council to impose different types of sanctions 
on states, in case of threats to the international peace and security.112 But still, the veto 
power of the 3 NAtO’s Member states of the security Council’s five permanent members 
can avoid the imposition of sanctions against their own acts of aggression, or against 
the acts of aggression, committed as a consequence of their participation in NAtO. the 
may be required to withdraw from membership in the Fund by a decision of the Board of Governors 
carried by a majority of the Governors having eighty-five percent of the total voting power."
110  Article 13 of the North Atlantic treaty states:
"After the treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after 
its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the united states of America, which 
will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation."
111  Article 60(2) of the vienna Convention on the Law of treaties establishes:
"A material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles:
(a) the other parties by unanimous agreement to suspend the operation of the treaty in whole or 
in part or to terminate it either:
(i) in the relations between themselves and the defaulting state, or
(ii) As between all the parties."
112  According to Article 41 of the u.N. Charter,
"the security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be 
employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the united Nations 
to apply such measures. these may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations 
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance 
of diplomatic relations."
in the same sense, by virtue of Article 42,
"should the security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate 
or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary 
to maintain or restore international peace and security. such action may include demonstrations, 
blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the united Nations."
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only organ in international law that is capable to act as a Policeman and use coercive 
power against states is politically unable to impose sanctions on NAtO and its Member 
states, in order to submit their behavior to the respect of the ius ad bellum norms and 
principles. this strong paradox of the post-world war ii international liberal order is 
another impermeable umbrella for NAtO’s impunity under international law.
Conclusion
NAtO’s alleged “brain death” is certainly a consequence of many recent events 
in international politics, but it is also a sign of the organization’s lost legitimacy in 
international law. NAtO has repeatedly violated its own constitutive treaty and has also 
breached many of its obligations under general international law and its specialized 
branches. however, in practice, it has never assumed any negative legal consequence 
for its internationally unlawful behavior. the de facto international irresponsibility 
of NAtO, its Member states’ and its personnel, as well as the impossibility to impose 
sanctions to the organization on the basis of its constitutive treaty and/or the u.N. 
Charter have afforded to this organization an almost complete impunity under 
international (and domestic) law. this situation creates the impression that NAtO is, 
in fact, a de legibus solutus entity, i.e. an entity unbound by international law, placed 
above international law and out for itself.
(international) law’s primary objective is to establish effective mechanisms 
to ensure that perpetrators of violations of its norms and principles will not go 
unpunished. (international) law certainly becomes a mockery when its own rules 
exempt these perpetrators from responsibility. All (international) law’s institutions 
and mechanisms are (and should be) aimed to promote accountability and respect 
for the rule of law. in this sense, NAtO’s current status in international law is legally 
(intellectually and morally) untenable, as it is a status by which NAtO pretends 
to impose, by the use of force if necessary, respect for the rule of law to others, 
but doesn’t abide rules itself. thus, NAtO’s status under international law actually 
permits to that organization to put in place a coercive system of dominance upon 
others, using force that is untied to the mutually agreed norms and principles of 
international law. under these circumstances, it is clear that states might not accept 
to cooperate with NAtO and will reject NAtO’s provisions of security. As showed in 
this article, resistance and opposition to NAtO now come not only from the outside, 
but also from the inside of the organization.
From a legal perspective NAtO’s impunity in international law is completely 
unacceptable and should lead not only to its “brain death,” but to its death, per se, as 
an ultimate extra-legal way to put an end to its impunity. Legally speaking, the only 
way towards NAtO’s survival is to bind this organization to international law and to 
provide legal mechanisms for submitting its political and military power to the rule 
of law. Only that way could NAtO legitimate its functions, continue to protect its 
core principles and values and preserve its privileged position in the maintenance 
of the international peace and security.
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Many legal reforms could be proposed in this sense. therefore, for example, NAtO 
could become a party to the european Convention on human rights (and/or to other 
international human rights treaties) and submit itself to the jurisdiction of the eCthr 
(and/or to that of other international human rights judicial bodies). NAtO’s Member 
states could modify the North Atlantic treaty in order to establish sanctions to parties 
that violate this agreement or other norms and principles of international law. NAtO 
could accept automatic waivers of its immunity from jurisdiction before domestic 
tribunals for acts that are contrary to ius cogens rules. this organization could 
establish its own international ad hoc tribunal, with jurisdiction to hear demands 
against NAtO, its Member states or its personnel, for violations of international law. 
the institution could provide other mechanisms for the reparation of the prejudices 
suffered by the victims of its internationally unlawful behavior (such as indemnity 
funds, for example). it could even envisage to offer public excuses to the victims 
and their families. NAtO could urge France, the u.s. and the uk not to use their 
veto power in the security Council when it comes to refer a case involving NAtO’s 
personnel’s international crimes to the international criminal justice.
however, all these reforms seem to be completely utopic, legally and politically.
Legally, they are completely unrealistic, because of NAtO’s decision-making 
mechanisms. All the important decisions within the alliance are taken by its main 
political body: the North Atlantic Council. these decisions are made on the basis 
“of unanimity and common accord,” as they need to express “the collective will 
of all member countries of the Alliance.”113 the requirement of unanimity in the 
decision making processes of NAtO grants a veto power to every Member state 
of the organization. Consequently, any legal reform and any amendment of the 
North Atlantic treaty could not proceed if one Member state of the organization 
is opposed to its adoption. the unanimity rule is a “bastion” of states’ sovereignty 
and ensures respect for their national interests at the international level. however, 
in an organization that has 29 Member states with divergent power capacities and 
international agendas, this rule is also a source of institutional blockages and decision-
making paralysis of all types. the westphalia model of sovereignty that justified the 
adoption of the unanimity rule in NAtO’s (and other post-world war ii international 
organizations’) legal framework is not adapted to the current multipolar global order, 
where states’ “common accord” is too difficult to achieve.
Politically, these reforms have little hope to succeed, because they would amount 
to a “political suicide” and would mean the renunciation to exorbitant privileges, 
gained to a war price, and guaranteeing a source of uncontested power.
however, the adoption of no reforms at all would further NAtO’s current decline and 
“brain death” and place it in a very dangerous situation for its survival. will NAtO show the 
resilience and readjustment needed to endure this period of impasse, or is its regional 
collective defense system near to be over? Perhaps no, but only future can tell.
113  North Atlantic Council, NAtO (Jul. 2, 2020), available at https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_ 
49763.htm.
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